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Final Transcript

Matloff: This is an oral history interview with Mr. Paul R. Ignatius held in Washington, D.C., on March 31, 1987, at 9:30 a.m. The interview is being recorded on tape, and a copy of the transcript will be sent to Mr. Ignatius for his review. Representing the OSD Historical Office are Dr. Roger Trask and Dr. Maurice Matloff.

Mr. Ignatius, as we indicated in our letter of March 10, 1987, we shall focus in this interview particularly on your roles as Assistant Secretary of the Army for Installations and Logistics, 1961-63; Under Secretary of the Army, 1964; Assistant Secretary of Defense for Installations and Logistics, 1964-67; and Secretary of the Navy, 1967-69. These assignments gave you a unique and broad outlook on the Department of Defense. In your first assignment, as Assistant Secretary of the Army, I&L, what was the background of that appointment? Had you had any contacts with OSD or any Secretaries of Defense before your appointment in May 1961?

Ignatius: I had had contacts with OSD. I'm not sure I had met personally with any prior Secretaries of Defense, but I had met with Assistant Secretaries of Defense, and possibly a Deputy. This was in connection with work I had done over an eleven-year period, before coming into the Defense Department, as one of the founders and an officer of Harbridge House, a consulting firm initially in Cambridge and then in Boston, Massachusetts. We had done a good deal of work for all of the services and for OSD, in at least one instance, in the field of procurement, supply, and distribution, and knew a number of the people. One person I recall doing a project for was Thomas Morris, who was then Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, I&L, in the Eisenhower period.

Matloff: How familiar were you with the trends in Defense organization and management since the passage of the National Security Act in July 1947?

Ignatius: I was quite familiar with that, again, in connection with our Harbridge House work. For example, in the mid-1950s Congress wanted the Defense Department to introduce financial management accounting. It had excellent accounting so far as individual items were concerned, but it wasn't possible to aggregate the inventories in financial terms. Congress passed legislation requiring this procedure, and it required a great deal of work on the part of the services and considerable training. The Army asked Harbridge House, and I was personally involved in this activity, to set up, first, a school at Fort Belvoir, called a Command Management School, and later a series of quite good courses at Fort Lee, Virginia, that covered individual functional areas of supply and logistics. All of these were manifestations of some of the changes both in organization and in management philosophy. In the case of the Army, an organizational change involved putting the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, in a sense, in charge of the technical services of the Army. Prior to that, they had been quite autonomous, and there was a delicacy concerned with this change. Words like "command" had to be avoided, but words like "direct" were all right; "control" was a little tough. At any rate, I was involved in a lot of these activities through research, writing, and some teaching.

Matloff: What were the circumstances of your appointment?

Ignatius: I was in Chicago on an assignment, and received a call from Secretary of the Army Elvis Stahr, who told me that he had heard about me and asked if I would come in and talk to him about the possibility of an appointment as an Assistant Secretary of the Army. I told him that I was busy and did not think I could do it—that some day I wanted to do government service but I was quite occupied at the moment. He said to come in anyway, and I did. I met with him and the Under Secretary, Stephen Ailes, and one or two others. I went back to Boston, where I was then living, and talked with my wife. This was a family decision; we had four young children in school. After some thought I decided to come in. I was quite attracted by President Kennedy. I had not been involved in politics, but his call to serve the country, I thought, was good and useful. A lot of very able people had responded, and I was pleased to have that opportunity and privilege. We moved down, and that began a long period of government service.

Matloff: How well did you know Secretary of Defense McNamara, Deputy Secretary of Defense Gilpatric, Army Secretary Stahr, and Under Secretary Ailes?

Ignatius: I had known about Secretary McNamara when I was a student at the Harvard Business School. He is four or five years older than I. For a brief period, before he was called to serve as an Air Force officer, he was an assistant professor at the Harvard Business School, and people were already beginning to talk about him. As a student I had heard about him as being a very capable person. After the war I was fascinated, as so many people were, with the changes that took place at the Ford Motor

Company, with Tex Thornton going back with Bob and a number of other very capable people. They took over a company that had been managed by an old-fashioned genius, Henry Ford, and introduced modern management techniques. I knew about all that, but beyond that, I didn't know him in person. I got to know him very quickly, within the first six weeks or so that I was in the Department. Tom Morris had known me and knew that I had some professional qualifications for the job that I was in. He began taking me to some of his regular Friday morning meetings with the Secretary because a lot of what they wanted to accomplish at that time had to do with the Army. So very early on I began meeting through Tom Morris directly with the Secretary of Defense, which is a little bit unusual for an Assistant Secretary on the Army level. We hit it off quickly, and seemed to be talking the same language.

Matloff: You had known Morris before, then?

Ignatius: I had, and had done an assignment when he was a Deputy Assistant Secretary, some years before that, involving the supply systems of all of the military services. Interestingly enough, my associate at Harbridge House, Sterling Livingston, received a phone call shortly after President Kennedy's election asking for suggestions for an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Installations and Logistics and Livingston called me. I said that Tom Morris would be wonderful for that job, that he had the broadest experience and was a true professional. That name was passed on—I'm sure that others also thought of Tom—and he eventually ended up as the Assistant Secretary of Defense. At a later point, Elvis Stahr turned to Tom Morris and asked him for suggestions for Assistant Secretary of Army,

I&L, and I learned later that Tom suggested me as a person who was well qualified.

Matloff: Your careers track. We are going to be talking to Mr. Morris next week. Was the transition from the consulting field, the corporate world, to government difficult?

Ignatius: No, I don't think so. There are always changes that involve adjustments. You work with one group of people, and then with another. But I must say that I found the Army people extremely friendly and anxious to work with me. They had known me from the past. I had done work for the Army over a period of 8 or 9 years. They felt that I was competent in the field for which I had responsibility and they were willing and anxious to work with me. I found it an excellent working environment, with the civilian career people as well as the uniformed people.

Matloff: What instructions or directives were given to you, and by whom? Was it purely within the Army, or did anybody in OSD pass on any guidance?

Ignatius: There was a lot of policy guidance from OSD in this period. Before he was officially sworn in, Bob McNamara took up residence in the Defense Department for a period of several weeks of the most intensive preparation. Out of that came a series of initiatives, 75 or so of them, many of them involving the Army, so there was probably more direction from OSD at that time than is usually the case. It was all-encompassing. McNamara brought in Charlie Hitch to be his Comptroller, and through Hitch's work a whole new system of programming and budgeting was developed and installed that really became a model for many governments of the world and certainly for our own. There was, I thought, rather remarkable working

spirit and innovation. Within the services themselves, there was direction, but I would say that more of it at that time was coming from OSD.

Matloff: How did you conceive your role? What problems did you face? Did you set your priorities or were they set for you?

Ignatius: To some extent the priorities for the Army and for me were set by President Kennedy, because there had been, prior to his inauguration, a concept of massive retaliation at places of our choosing. The result of that was a large buildup in strategic forces and some reduction, rather considerable, in the amount of funding and equipping for the field forces and particularly for the Army. General Maxwell Taylor had been brought in as President Kennedy's military adviser and subsequently, after the Bay of Pigs, became Chairman. Gen. Taylor had written a book, The Uncertain Trumpet, in which he talked about the inadequacies, as he saw it, of the so-called Dulles doctrine of massive retaliation and the great need to establish conventional forces, in order to have usable military power. That effort involved the Army to a very great extent. I became intimately involved in all of the efforts to determine the Army requirements and then to set in motion programs to see that we would get the money and begin to place the procurements and bring in this new equipment. It was a massive re-equipping, and that was the principal policy initiative stemming from the President through the Secretary and devolving particularly upon the Army. There were others involving organization, which I can also go into.

Matloff: How much leeway did you have in selecting and organizing your staff, and how large a staff was it?

Ignatius: McNamara very wisely asked the President and received his authority to appoint his own people. He almost made that a condition of employment. So he was able to appoint the people he wanted and those of us below him had some of that same authority. The staff in my office in the Army was largely in place and something on the order of 60-70 people. One of the things that I liked was that shortly after I came there I got together with my military counterpart, Lt.Gen. Colglazier, Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, at his initiative. He said that we each had a staff doing procurement review and that we didn't both need to do that. He said that he would rather leave the staff in my office and he could get rid of some people. He stated that as a military man he was interested in what we bought and when, but how was of less concern to him and more to me. I mention this because to this day I continue to feel that there are opportunities to streamline a lot of the necessary decision-making and review through greater staff consolidation, and this was an early development where the civilian and military staffs avoided duplicating effort. I think that there are other ways in which this principle can be carried out.

Trask: That is interesting, because in a sense that is in the spirit of what is supposed to be going on right now.

Ignatius: I did a study of Defense Department organization during President Carter's and Harold Brown's administrations, and I thought, for example, in the R&D area in the Navy there was a large headquarters Pentagon staff under uniformed leadership, and then in the Secretary's office another group under Bob Frosch, a very able person who later became the head of NASA. When I suggested that they could be merged, Graham Claytor,

who was then the Navy Secretary, said that he was willing to do it. Right now that subject is again being emphasized, and, I think, to the good.

Matloff: What were your working relationships with OSD? Did you have any contacts with Secretary McNamara, Deputy Secretaries Gilpatric and Vance, and with various Assistant Secretaries of Defense?

Ignatius: I had direct, frequent, and continuing contact with Secretary McNamara. I think this was unusual for an Assistant Secretary of a military service, but it arose, I think, because Tom Morris began involving me in his regular Friday meetings with the Secretary. McNamara was interested in all of this effort to develop the conventional forces, and had a lot of interest in organizational matters in the Army. So I saw him a lot and worked directly with him. The first Thanksgiving when I was here in town I literally worked all night. We had pizza with anchovies on it. I'll never forget the sight of that congealed cheese with those anchovy strips on top, brought in to us somewhere around midnight, and I had visions of my family at home enjoying a turkey dinner. We were working on a major project that Tom Morris and I turned in to McNamara around 6:30 in the morning, because he was going to catch a plane to Hyannis to meet with President Kennedy. This gives an example of the intimacy and spirit of the time, when an Assistant Secretary of Defense out of OSD and a counterpart from out of the services were working with beards growing during the night, sleeves rolled up, pushing pencils. That was typical. There were other cases when Tom Morris would lend me someone from his office and simply detail him to my office in the Army. I remember one or two extremely capable civilians who were not officially moved, but

were simply detailed. Tom said they could do more good on that particular project working for me and they came in and augmented my staff. We had a lot of informal working together. With respect to others in OSD, I had some dealings with Gilpatric, and many with Vance, subsequently, when he replaced Elvis Stahr and became my superior in the Army. We developed a close relationship there, which continued when he went back to Defense. I also worked a lot with Comptroller Charlie Hitch, and I worked with people other than the Presidential appointees. One person I remember particularly in Hitch's office was Joe Hoover, the Budget Officer, and I can tell you some interesting anecdotal things later on, if you are interested. I also worked with the R&D side in Defense, and with Alain Enthoven's people in the economic and mathematical analyses that they were doing.

Matloff: How about with the JCS and its staff, did you have any dealings with them at all?

Ignatius: I had a lot of dealings with the JCS when I was Assistant Secretary of Defense, I&L, because that was the period of intense prosecution of the Vietnam War. When I was Assistant Secretary of the Army, I don't recall too many contacts with the JCS, except that I would see the Chief of Staff of the Army on a regular basis, but I saw him in his capacity as the Army chief rather than in his role as a member of the Joint Chiefs.

Matloff: When Vance replaced Stahr in 1962, did that mean any changes in your working relationships with the OSD officials at all?

Ignatius: No, I don't think so. I think my relationships continued pretty much the same. McNamara reposed the greatest confidence in Vance,

because Vance had been his general counsel, and he had high regard for him. I think that generally in the Army we felt that we had an opportunity through Vance for the Army's views to be considered very carefully. There was a very fine bond between those two men, which has continued to this day.

Matloff: Did you consult with anyone in OSD on the interaction of logistics with strategy?

Ignatius: I think one of the reasons I began working closely with McNamara was that I became very interested in getting the Army properly equipped and prepared, and I was seeking some kind of base line that would give me a standard against which to measure how well we were doing. So I began exploring this with uniformed people, and one of the top logistical officers, a very experienced general officer, a planning type, told me the goal was 100 divisions. I asked, "You mean we're going to buy equipment for 100 divisions?" He said, "Yes, that's the requirement." I asked, "How has the funding been going on that?" He replied, "Terribly inadequate; we're not getting anything." I asked, "What do we have?" It became very apparent that something like this was not a meaningful standard for any kind of managerial purpose, and so I began talking to McNamara about this and said, "We've got to have something here." He agreed. All of this, if you will, relates, I think, to your question of strategy, because a strategy must take into account what kind of war you are going to fight and what kind of resources are going to be available for it. Out of this effort and this intellectual quest, if you will, came a series of very specific guidelines, which was called logistic guidance, where we

had, overall for the Army, planning guidance for acquisition of equipment and consumable supplies and a concept that involved a warm base of production lines for items that were critical. We did a lot of work over a period of several years to establish standards and then to obtain the funds to get us on the road toward achieving those standards and placing the vast procurement programs that were required. All of this was for the purpose of developing conventional, usable, military power without in any way sacrificing the strategic deterrent, which was the underpinning for everything. That was the single most important thing, to have an unquestioned strategic deterrent. But having said that, there was the desire to have conventional power in the event that it was needed, and in order to do that, the logistical capability, the equipment, the force that we were trying to equip became very important. There was no force structure in the Army against which one could plan. General Colglazier told me one day that, as the logistical chief of the Army, he finally had to decide what the force structure was, in order to determine what the requirements were. When Cy Vance became Secretary of the Army and became acquainted in detail with some of these things, he set up a new general officer position, called Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Structure, for the purpose of looking not simply at how many divisions, but just what the mix of battalions should be. Having determined that, deciding what the equipment should be for it was an enormous task that had never been done as well as it needed to be. Vance saw that and put Ed Rowney, who is now the adviser to the President on arms control, in that position.

Matloff: The figure you cited, 100 divisions, interests me because the most the Army got in World War II was 90.

Ignatius: Well, onward and upward.

Matloff: How serious a problem was interservice rivalry for you in your field and what affect did it have on Army policies, programs, and operations?

Ignatius: I'd like to make a philosophical comment first. The idea of rivalry between and among the services, per se, doesn't bother me; in fact, I rather like the idea. I wouldn't want to see military people too shy and hanging back. The idea that each of them comes forward and says, "I can take care of that threat," to me is probably a good rather than a bad thing up to that point. You certainly don't want a situation developing where a commander says, "I want you to take that hill," and the officer says, "I guess I could, but I suppose the Air Force maybe could do it better." That is not a quality of aggressiveness that you want to inculcate in people wearing the uniform. However, this kind of rivalry can result in military deficiencies if it produces too much of some things and not enough of others. Along with this, it always seemed to me that you needed an exceedingly good staff with very capable people in the Office of the Secretary of Defense who would look at requirements proposed by the individual services and through analysis and review make final decisions. During the McNamara period, this staff was developed under Charlie Hitch, Alain Enthoven, and others, working with the services. They have been criticized in some respects, and occasionally some of the people were overbearing in the way they went about their work. But,

conceptually, it seemed to me to be an absolutely essential function, in order to have balanced forces. As to whether the rivalry was a problem for the Army during the period in which I served, no, I don't think so. We were doing pretty well in those days, because the reassessment of U.S. strategic concepts—General Taylor's views—aided the Army, and we were getting better funding than we had for years. One of the proudest moments of my life in that period—I was fairly young and fairly junior in the scheme of things—was a visit to my office from Gen. Taylor. He had come over from the White House with the specific purpose of telling me how enormously pleased he was with the leadership I was giving to this effort, and how pleased he was to see the Army finally getting equipped so that it could do its job. I was really walking on air for several days after that.

Matloff: That fits in with his writing that the Army had been in a "Babylonian captivity" during the Eisenhower administration. We've talked with him and with Enthoven, so some of these threads will come together. On the question of budget, what responsibilities did you have in connection with the Army budget? Who was setting the ceilings for your department in your area of interest?

Ignatius: A lot of the budget was for procurement, supply, and all of that. I was very much involved with that, working with people who had functional responsibility for budget preparation. Bill Schaub, who had come over from the Bureau of the Budget, was the Army chief financial officer at the time. I had a great deal of responsibility for and involvement with the input to the budget from the logistical side. You never do

the budget once in the Pentagon; you are always in some kind of a budget exercise. There were lots of supplementals and special efforts that were developed. I remember one that was associated with the crisis that arose over Berlin in the early period. At McNamara's request I prepared a shopping list of items for the Army. It was another one of those all night exercises. I remember working on a yellow pad of paper. I had gone over all of these items with one or two senior Army people. The Vice Chief of Staff in particular, I remember, got up at 5:30 in the morning and came over to the Pentagon. We sat down and reviewed item by item. I wanted his judgment on what should be the number that we should go for and he would make very professional comments that if we were short on a bayonet that was not as important as being short on something else, because there weren't all that many people killed with bayonets. He was an artilleryman, I might add, Barksdale Hamlett, a marvelous name. I first worked with him and then with OSD. We worked that night in Tom's office and developed three columns: "low," "high," and "best buy," which was a judgmental factor, based in part on the work with Gen. Hamlett. I remember taking that in to McNamara a bit bleary-eyed, because it was an all-night session. He looked at the methodology of "low," "high," and "best buy," and I was telling him what we had done, and he quickly saw that and immediately took out his pen and initialed with his left hand "OK, RSM." I mention this because I think it's important about McNamara. There's a feeling that he was a sort of computer in human clothing and that he simply worked from IBM sheets. What McNamara feared most was that the material coming to him hadn't been through the brain of one person

whom he knew and trusted. He had a feeling that, when he saw 25 signatures on something, no one person had really gone over anything in detail, because each person figured somebody else must have done it. When you brought him something that had been worked out and with a methodology that you could see and that had been through, in his phrase, "the mind of one person," particularly someone he trusted, that was very important to him. That involved an enormous amount of money in those days, something like half a billion dollars. He took that up to Hyannisport. I went back down to the Army area in the Pentagon feeling pretty good, because we had gotten this money to help us and everybody was pleased. But time went by, and the money didn't come, and everybody was asking me where it was. I marched up to Joe Hoover's office, the OSD budget officer, with my xeroxed copy of this piece of paper with McNamara's initials, and said, "We don't have the money, and I have McNamara's approval on this." Hoover looked me straight in the eye and said, "You may have Secretary McNamara's signature on that, but you don't have mine." I learned at that point how things really run. Eventually we got Mr. Hoover's approval also, and the money finally came.

Matloff: Did you have any dealings with Mr. Hitch in this regard? or through Hoover?

Ignatius: Yes, I worked with Hitch on much of this, but he was occupied for the most part in work that didn't involve me directly. He would ask me, for example, "If we were to do this, how would it affect you?" If I were to ask you to provide this kind of information, what form would it

take and when could you get it in? What would be the period in which it should come?" There was, if you will, consultation back and forth.

Matloff: Did you feel the Army was getting its fair share of the Defense budget in your area?

Ignatius: I did. I think we were doing fine in those days.

Matloff: What was your reaction to the introduction of the reforms of the PPBS system? Were you favorably disposed?

Ignatius: I was, for this reason: prior to coming into office, there had been a study on defense organization that Roswell Gilpatric had participated in with two or three people—the Symington Report. That report essentially recommended that because of interservice rivalry and the need to establish proper controls in OSD, in effect the services should be merged into some kind of single service concept, perhaps along the lines that the Canadians subsequently adopted some years later. McNamara, I think, was wise enough to see that if he embarked upon this, the controversy surrounding it in the country, the press, and particularly the Congress, not to mention the military services themselves, would be so enormous that it would overshadow anything else that he might want to do. So he determined to bring about the objectives of that study, that is to say, better oversight and control from OSD, through managerial means rather than changing the organization in such a controversial way. The backbone of all this was the planning, programming, and budgeting system, to which he looked to Charlie Hitch for development and implementation, coupled with the overview of the individual requirements coming to the services through the Systems Analysis Office; and finally, through logistical

guidance, which I talked about earlier, which gave a base line initially worked out in the Army but ultimately for all the services, so we had balanced forces and we had usable combat power, in the event that we needed to employ it. For all of these reasons and others, McNamara achieved, I felt, the objectives of the Symington Report, without the difficulties that clearly would have occurred. I think Roswell Gilpatric, who served as McNamara's Deputy and had been one of the principals in the Symington study, came around to that point of view with the passage of time.

Matloff: We've spoken with Gilpatric, had four sessions with McNamara, and we also spoke with Enthoven, so we're getting different slants on this. Did this new system in any way complicate your dealings with the military?

Ignatius: The military initially were skeptical about some of this. I think perhaps less so in the Army, because things were going pretty well for us. McNamara respected the military uniformed officer, but he wouldn't accept, in his phrase, "anybody's un-cross-examined opinion." He didn't like people pontificating, saying that it ought to be this way because this is the way it has always been. Moreover, some of the people who were doing this work in OSD were very bright and sometimes more brash than they should have been. So there were some personal problems when some of these young geniuses offended the long-time professionals. In the case of the Army, I don't think we had that feeling perhaps as much as in the Air Force and the Navy. The Navy always has been reluctant to accept OSD leadership, if one were to make a comparison among the services. Where we got involved, in the Army, in matters of controversy, it had to do

with the reorganization and elimination of the technical services of the Army.

Matloff: More than on issues of weaponry or manpower?

Ignatius: I think on issues of weaponry and manpower there were some internal struggles in the Army having to do with Army aviation. McNamara and his counterparts in OSD believed that getting lighter divisions with large numbers of helicopters was an important thing. He established something called the Howze Board, which was composed of Lieutenant General Howze of the Army together with some other people, and finally brought into being what initially was called "the air cav division." Later on the extensive use of helicopters tended to permeate the Army as a whole. There was some controversy over that within the Army, but basically I think that was surmounted fairly quickly. The Army, again, was getting a good shake, if you will, out of the budget and Defense dollar. The reorganizational change was in some respects more difficult. The Army Ordnance Corps had been extremely powerful and didn't give up without a pretty strong battle. The head of the Corps, Gen. John Hinrichs, I think his name was, finally resigned, and we established in the Army an overall logistical command under Gen. Frank Besson. By the way, one of the few times McNamara left his office and came down into one of our Army conference rooms, we had a marvelous session. We were in the midst of this question of how to reorganize the technical services, and Bob had some big organizational charts and all these Army officers were there, prepared to hate him, I think, at least some of them. The first thing that he said was, "You know, the whole concept of organization in American business

came from the Army. The whole nature of line responsibility and staff responsibility, which I had at the Ford Motor Company before I came here, we learned from the Army." I tell you, you could just see those generals relax, and everybody suddenly thought maybe this fellow wasn't so bad after all. We all sat down and went to work on the problem.

Matloff: A fascinating area—the question of the relationship between the organization of the general staff and the business world? Who influenced whom?

Ignatius: A little of both, I suppose.

Matloff: Did you encounter any differences with the OSD "whiz kids," as they were called?

Ignatius: Sure. I did in the Army period, but more, probably, when I was the Navy Secretary. There are bound to be some differences, but there again, I think it is healthy to have this kind of difference, because these are important matters and having a good argument about them is a good thing.

Matloff: At those Friday meetings, did you also get into any of the discussions on Defense policies on logistics and installations? Did you have any impact on the course of those, even though you were coming from the Army level, via the Morris lead-in, to the OSD level?

Ignatius: One of the things that Tom Morris did well, and which I am glad to see the Defense Department is returning to, as a result of the Packard Commission's recent work, was to develop a commonality of interests among people with the same functional assignment. We—myself and my

service counterparts—together with Tom, worked together. We testified together. We would go up to Congress as the material secretaries and we would give testimony. We all had pretty much the same substantive assignments within our functional areas, so we could talk to one another. One of the things I was quite concerned to see in more recent years was a change in this, where the assistant secretary for logistical matters in one service would have an assignment often quite different from his counterpart in the other, so the ability to work together was hampered. This, in my opinion, was greatly worsened when logistics and manpower were combined under a single assistant secretary. I thought that Harold Brown was wrong in doing that, and I told him that in conversation and officially, since I was doing some work for him. Because I held those views, I was glad to see that was changed. Both of those jobs, manpower and logistics, are so important that I felt that we needed to have individual leadership for each of them. The Department has since returned to that position, and I think that it is highly desirable that it has.

Matloff: You mentioned testifying before Congress with the counterparts. How much leeway did you have when you were testifying? Were you working under any restrictions? Did you have to toe the OSD line, or could you speak for the service?

Ignatius: I don't recall that I was speaking for any line, in this sense: I felt that we were all working toward common objectives. In the procurement field they had to do with greater use of competitive procurement. Of course, we had our program of trying to bring spare parts under better control; that's an endemic problem over there. We had a vast base closure

program. We were all working on that. I felt by and large that because we had these overall policies that had come from Defense and upon which we were all working, that we could give useful testimony, and I didn't feel that I was toeing any particular line. I would make one other comment, perhaps to go into in more detail later. I felt that I was a proponant for the Army, and later for the Navy, but I also felt in everything I did that I was an official of the United States Department of Defense, and that blind advocacy for an individual service was not enough. You had to be an advocate; you were expected to be; it was part of the job. You were knowledgeable in your service, and if you weren't an advocate, the people in OSD would not get the information and advice that they needed. But the idea that it would be blind advocacy that didn't take account of the overall Defense needs seemed to me to be wrong. There had been cases in the past where some of this had gone on, and there was no place for it in the McNamara Pentagon, and there shouldn't have been.

Matloff: On the question of the base closings, did you run into controversy there, in dealings with Congress or with the Army military?

Ignatius: We certainly had problems both at the military level and with the Congress. No Army officer, or any military officer, I suppose, has ever gotten a medal for running out of anything. There is a tendency, because of this and because of the responsibilities that these people have if we ever go to war, to hang on to whatever they have. So there is a kind of built-in reluctance to closing bases in the belief that some day we might need them. Nevertheless, they worked very affirmatively,

and a number of these things turned out to be very much in the country's interest. One of the most controversial of all was Springfield Arsenal, founded by George Washington and closed by Robert McNamara. There was the deepest resentment in the New England community. I went up with Bob, and he was terribly upset. There was a picture in the paper that had Hitler on one side and McNamara on the other. What finally happened was that this arsenal, which was progressively less important in the scheme of things, was turned over to the public payroll, became a factory site for some companies in New England, and began producing tax revenues for the community, because by that point the Army had become interested in small arms that were made by other than the arsenal. This was the period of the shift from the M-1 rifle to the AR-15, later the M-16. Here was the closing of a base, that the Army finally went along with, and overall it was probably to everybody's good. The Congress had a very tough problem with its constituents. These bases were a source of employment, some prestige, etc. What we said was "We've done our homework as best we can, and when we close the base we're doing it because we believe that it serves no national security need. If you can show us that our analysis is incorrect, or that the factual base on which we've made the decision is incorrect, we will reassess the decision." I don't believe that in all those base closings we ever had to do that. We had to take some heat. Congressmen would come to my office, sometimes with constituents, and they would tell me all the terrible things that were going to happen. We would listen attentively and try to help to the extent that we could, but not by reversing the decision. There were about 75 closings in the

first group, and 74 of them were considered brilliant in everybody's mind. It was the 75th one that was wrong, and, of course, the 75th one was different, depending upon which congressman you were talking to. I don't think we ever reversed a decision, and they finally went along. We were able to cut back on a lot of unneeded facilities, with considerable savings.

Matloff: If you were to make a judgment, looking back on how the McNamara reforms in management affected your office and the whole area of installations and logistics for the Army, what was the overall impact?

Ignatius: First, the whole five-year force structure and financial planning has had a long-lasting effect on the Army, the Pentagon, and the government as a whole, and it seems to me all to the good. The emphasis on conventional forces, which began with President Kennedy and Secretary McNamara, I believe has continued to this day. Again, the primary military requirement for the United States is to have an undoubted strategic deterrent. That underpins and undergirds everything. But to this day we continue to talk about the need to have adequate conventional forces, and so I think that is, to some extent, a long-lasting affect of an effort that began during the McNamara period. Some of the same things that we stressed, particularly in the procurement field, are still being stressed today, and need to be. I think things like competition in procurement and managing spare parts better are never finally solved and you have to reinvigorate everybody from time to time in these fields. We're going through a period right now where this seems to be happening, but you can't ever leave it alone. The use of aviation in the Army was really started then, and has continued to this day.

Matloff: Were you or your office consulted on any of those foreign area problems or crises that arose in this period—Cuba, Berlin, NATO, involvement in Indochina?

Ignatius: I was involved in the Cuban missile crisis at what might be called the second level of indenture. At the highest level from the Defense Department, probably McNamara and Gilpatric and very few others were involved in the direct dealings with the President. But very shortly after that effort got started, I was brought into it, because one of the options that was being talked about involved the employment of military forces and the equipping of those forces, which I mentioned earlier as something in which I was intimately involved. So I was brought in on what we should be doing at this moment and what we would have to do in the immediate future, if certain decisions were made. With regard to Berlin, I worked on that in developing shopping lists of additional equipment that, I believe, I went into in detail earlier. So again, my work was in implementation of the decision, rather than the decision itself. I would say that generally characterized the nature of my work. It reflected the whole organization of the Department of Defense which was changed in the 1947 Act and in the later amendments, so that the services were no longer in the command chain as they had been before. The services were confined to people problems, equipment and materiel problems, and supply and distribution problems, and overall management.

Matloff: You weren't being consulted by OSD on the implications of any American involvement in Vietnam? This was still early—although Kennedy did increase the number of American military advisers in this period. One of his first acts doubled the number. How about problems of NATO, for example—the installations and logistics?

Ignatius: To take NATO first, I remember getting involved in quite a number of matters involving theater logistics in Europe and the line of communication, as the military people call it. This was prompted in part by the fact that the French changed their minds about willingness to participate. I got involved in matters such as whether we should preposition supplies in Europe rather than keeping them in the continental United States. In Vietnam, there were consultations, but with the gradualism that was taking place there, from my standpoint it tended to be, once again, the materiel, supply, and equipment distribution implications, rather than the foreign and Defense policy issues themselves.

Matloff: What do you regard as your major achievements during your tenure as Assistant Secretary in the Army for I&L?

Ignatius: First, getting the Army better equipped at a time when it needed to be. Secondly, getting proper long-term guidance to govern and permit the management of Army logistics. Thirdly, helping to bring about a more effective logistics organization for the Army. Finally, direct personal contribution in getting a much better system for measuring the readiness of the Army. I recall this last point vividly, because the

• General Accounting Office had submitted a number of reports on material deficiencies in the Army, and there was a tendency to "answer" these reports, feeling that those people didn't understand the problem. But I finally decided that maybe where there's smoke there's fire, and that these reports might be a source of help to us rather than a threat to us, because they seemed to be factually well supported. So I went to the Secretary of the Army, Elvis Stahr, and said, "I think we have a problem here that we need to work on with the military. We can't simply disregard these reports; these are serious matters." He then talked to the Chief of Staff, Harold Johnson, and we convened a weekend conference at Fort Monroe on this whole subject. We talked about readiness, a complicated subject—what it is; how do you measure it; how inclusive should it be? We devoted that weekend to come up with general principles. Then the Army picked, I thought, one of its finest officers and put him in charge of this program—Creighton Abrams, later the Commander in Vietnam and Chief of Staff. Abe was then a major general, as I remember. They brought him back from Europe, where he had commanded an armored division, and put him in charge, showing how important it was. I felt good about that, because I felt, first, that there was an acceptance of the fact that the GAO was an entity of the government that ought to be taken seriously; and secondly, the mark of any good organization, I think, is the capacity for critical self-analysis. The Army certainly did that. You can't do more than what Gen. Johnson and the Secretary did in that case, of convening a meeting of this kind. This was all of the general staff, together with the Secretariat—the top officials of the Army. Then, finally, putting

someone of Abrams' undoubted capacity in the job was the way of communicating to the Army that we took this very seriously, because there were a lot of places they could have put Abrams but they chose to put him there.

Matloff: Now to your role as Under Secretary of the Army in 1964, for about a ten-month period. What led to this appointment?

Ignatius: There had been a change in the overall leadership of the Army. Stahr had left and Vance had come down as Secretary. Subsequently, Vance was recalled to the Department of Defense to serve as the Deputy Secretary of Defense when Gilpatric left. McNamara pulled Vance back into his immediate structure and made him the Deputy, and Stephen Ailes, who had been the Under Secretary, was made Secretary of the Army. I was asked to be Under Secretary and Ailes talked to me about this. He and I had become good friends personally and close colleagues in our official work. Stephen told me that the Under Secretary was kind of the manpower civilian official, that he thought some of the things that I had been doing in the logistical field had application in the manpower field, and that it would be a good thing to bring about this kind of transfer. Also, I suppose it was a promotion, if you will, because you sat a little bit higher in the pecking order. So, for both those reasons, this position was offered to me, and those were the circumstances in which it came about.

Matloff: By then, did you know, or had you met President Johnson?

Ignatius: I had not known President Johnson before coming into the Pentagon, and the contacts I had with him directly did not begin until I was an Assistant Secretary of Defense, and later as Secretary of the Navy. I don't recall any direct contact with him before then.

Matloff: Were any instructions or directives given to you in this post, and by whom?

Ignatius: I wasn't in that job very long. I looked to Stephen quite a lot. He had done a good job in this area, and I was moving ahead on initiatives that he had started. The problem in manpower was always just really trying to get a handle on it. It was a vast organization and there were always arguments going on on whether you had too many or not enough, first in terms of the Army's overall mission, but also in terms of the accounting for all of this. You had certain end strengths that you had to meet; the question of how many accessions you needed in order to get there. One controversial area in that period had to do with bringing into the service people who couldn't meet some of the standards, in the belief that it would be a way somehow to improve the quality of people in the nation as a whole. That was controversial, and that was OSD-promulgated—to that extent there was direction.

Matloff: One of McNamara's initiatives was to reorganize the reserves and merge them with the National Guard. Were you drawn in on that problem?

Ignatius: Yes, I was, both as the I&L Secretary and as the Under Secretary. I don't recall any specific thing as Under Secretary that was different from the Assistant Secretary period, but there were a lot of controversies that were never wholly resolved.

Matloff: Did you as Under Secretary get into any controversies over weaponry in this period?

Ignatius: It's hard for me to place some of these in the exact points of time. The principal controversy over weaponry in the Army was the rifle. The Army initially felt the AR-15 was being imposed upon them. That was something that, I think, continued on when I was Under Secretary. There also were a lot of questions involving the use of aviation, but, again, those involved me more as the I&L Secretary. For example, the Army requirements tended to look at all equipment in the same manner. It had to work equally well in Alaska and the Canal Zone. It tended to be very heavy and bulky. The aviation people came to me when I was Assistant Secretary and said, "You can't carry in an airplane the equipment that you can carry on a 5-ton truck. It would never get off the ground. We've got to have some freedom from this process." There was controversy about this, because these were time-honored requirements. Again, some of that continued in the Under Secretary's role, and because Stephen had worked in manpower I tended to consult with him to some degree. Because I had worked so intensively in the I&L field, I was still also getting consulted in I&L matters when I was Under Secretary.

Matloff: Did your working relationships with the OSD level change in any way?

Ignatius: I think I had less involvement with OSD as Under Secretary of the Army than I had had as Assistant Secretary, I&L, for some of the reasons that I spoke about earlier.

Matloff: Would the same be true about dealings with the JCS? with Congress?

Ignatius: Yes, I would say that I had fewer dealings with the Congress as the Under Secretary than I did as Assistant Secretary—fewer dealings with the OSD.

Matloff: Even with Norman Paul, who was then the manpower and reserve affairs man? In light of Ailes' interest in manpower, there might have been more of an interest there.

Ignatius: I was in that job only 9 or 10 months—in the first period you're just getting adjusted; in the final period you're getting ready for the change. It wasn't a very long period, and so I'm able to give you some general comments here rather than very explicit ones. I suppose that if I could research the matter a little bit, my mind would be clearer on some of the immediate things that we worked on in the manpower area during my tenure.

Matloff: How about the budget? Did you have many dealings with OSD on that?

Ignatius: Yes, and with the Army staff, also, because there were a lot of questions about what you needed to budget for the manpower side, both in terms of numbers of people and the dollars associated with it. I do remember some of that. I worked closely with the military counterpart, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel.

Matloff: On the question of Indochina in this period, particularly the Tonkin Gulf incident and the congressional resolution—did you have any reaction to either of those, or did anybody consult with you about these

incidents that led to greater involvement by the United States in the Vietnam conflict?

Ignatius: I don't know what consultation might have taken place between Secretary Ailes and people in Defense on that. In my own case, I don't recall having my views sought on the strategic aspects of what we were doing. I was very much involved in my Army role, but more particularly later on, when I became Assistant Secretary of Defense, in very important questions about the serious logistical problems.

Matloff: When you look back on that period, are there any achievements that stand out in your mind, or disappointments, or frustrations?

Ignatius: I think that the Army people would probably remember more of what I did in the logistical field, because that was a period of rather considerable change and innovation in which I was directly, and, I think, usefully involved. Whatever good work was done in the manpower field, and some excellent work had been done by Stephen Ailes, I couldn't claim any particular credit for. I don't think of anything that stands out in my mind, as was the case earlier. I carried on adequately in work that had been initiated by others, but I don't look to the Under Secretary period for any significant accomplishments for which I could claim direct credit.

Matloff: When you moved up into the office of Assistant Secretary of Defense for Installations and Logistics, the post you held from December 1964 to August 1967, I would like to ask the same question as before, what circumstances led to that appointment?

Ignatius: As I said earlier, I had worked directly and personally with McNamara to an unusual degree for a service Assistant Secretary, so he

knew me quite well. Vance was the Deputy Secretary and knew me very well from all of the work he and I did together when he was Secretary of the Army. Vance and McNamara had high regard for Tom Morris, and when he decided to leave and go back into management consulting, my understanding is that they very quickly turned to me. Everything seemed to point to a foregone conclusion that if Tom left, McNamara would ask me to replace him. He did ask me. If I remember, it was on my birthday when the subject was broached, November 11, Armistice Day. He talked to me about it, and I said that I had really just gotten started in the manpower job and liked being in the Army, and enjoyed working there. He said, "I need you here." That's what led to that.

Matloff: Were any special instructions given to you by McNamara or the Deputy Secretary of Defense, or were any words of wisdom left by your predecessor?

Ignatius: Tom and I had been in and out of one another's office for a period of 3 1/2 years, so he knew what I was doing and I knew what he was doing. There was one particular area that Tom had worked on under McNamara's overall guidance, and that was the so-called cost reduction program. I then became the senior departmental official to carry on that program, inheriting it from Tom, and that involved base closures as well as a number of initiatives in the procurement and supply fields. I suppose that I ran the office in OSD along the same general lines that Tom did, but I did one thing quite differently, which reflected the changed emphasis that was taking place in the Department. The war had gotten pretty big by the time I got into the I&L job, so that my time was spent to a far

greater extent than Tom's was on the immediate and pressing military problems, sometimes involving day-to-day crises. This became the period of the most intense working environment and effort that I have ever had in my life, and it was concerned with these enormous problems of providing the wherewithall for what was becoming a very large war.

Matloff: What were the differences between operating at the Army level in this field and operating at the OSD level, aside from the nature of the problem, the fact there was a war now which was heating up?

Ignatius: The changed emphasis was the main thing, and that was a function of the changing times rather than where I sat on the organizational chart, but the other aspect of it was that I was the coordinating element, if you will, for all of the services. For example: at the Army level I might be concerned with a particular program, and I was supposed to get on top of it and do something about it. In OSD, we soon found that, with this vast procurement and production program that we were carrying on, shortages developed. For example, there was one month, February or whatever it was, where all of the aluminum forging capacity had been overcommitted by the Air Force and the Navy for fighter plane production, and by the Army for helicopter production. This is the kind of problem that you get into as the senior material official in OSD. You get the service counterparts and the J-4 in and you do a coordinating job that you wouldn't ordinarily do at the service level.

Matloff: Did you work along with the same staff that you inherited, or did you make changes in the staff?

Ignatius: I made some changes, augmenting the staff I inherited. I brought in at least one senior military officer, Maj. Gen. Stanwix-Hay, and I shifted the assignments of one or two very able civilians in the office because we had to organize, manage, and control an ammunition procurement program that was on the order of magnitude of World War II. Staying on top of this was a very major effort. Moreover, we had the most serious supply and distribution problems, and so I needed to augment the staff in order to overcome these things. I became a troubleshooter. In fact, McNamara called me an "expediter." To give you one example in the distribution field, we set up something called the "red ball express." We could not afford the shipping times for critically needed items and came up with a very simple way of literally putting a red ball sticker on priority equipment that had to be flown out there because we were getting reports of helicopters and ground vehicles not being combat ready because of maintenance difficulties. Part of the problem was inherent. It resulted from a very gritty kind of earth, laterite, it was called—dust that would simply grind up moving parts faster than in normal usage—so we found that we had serious maintenance problems and supply deficiencies. We had to get the stuff and then get it over there quickly. This part of the I&L job at that time was very important.

Matloff: You were moving equipment from the States to Vietnam? How about from Europe to Vietnam?

Ignatius: There was one period, I remember, when we moved a lot of supplies from the States to Vietnam, and some from Europe. A temporary problem

had developed because Adm. Sharp, who was running the air war from Oahu, had overflown the programmed number of sorties in a particular month and the expenditure of ordnance, accordingly, greatly exceeded the planned level for that month. At the same time, the struggle of the Buddhists in Hue resulted in a general unavailablility of the offloading facilities there, with ammunition ships standing by to be unloaded. I happened to be in Vietnam with Vance on a trip at that time, and on the final day we had had lunch with Ambassador Lodge prior to our departure. As I was leaving the Ambassador's dining room, the chief Air Force tactical commander there asked if he could have a word with me. He told me that there was a real problem over ammunition, because of the factors I mentioned, as I subsequently learned. We flew back immediately, arriving late Friday night, flying all the way in a tanker from Saigon. Vance and I went in to see McNamara Saturday morning and told him about this. McNamara said, "Get right out to Pearl Harbor, take a couple of people with you, sit down with Oley Sharp and find out what the hell is going on." I might add that the jet lag problem was something I haven't forgotten. At any rate we went, and I learned exactly what the facts were, and we clearly had some supply and distribution problems. They were imbalances in some cases. We had bombs without fins; bombs and fins without fuzes; more for the Navy and less for the Air Force. We spent about 36 hours at Pearl with several of my people and came back and took charge of what amounted to a redistribution of assets. I went down to see Adm. McDonald, the Chief of Naval Operations. He wasn't happy about it, but we had to borrow

some Navy stocks for the Air Force. We had a lot of stocks held in reserve at a depot in Utah, and we moved some of that out. This is an example of the kinds of things that we were involved in to prosecute a war of growing intensity with an expenditure of conventional ordnance at rates that in some cases exceeded those of World War II.

Matloff: Would you say that was the number one problem during this period, supporting the war in Vietnam?

Ignatius: I would say that that was the number one problem and the principal activity that occupied my efforts. We had some very serious production problems. I remember some of the numbers to this day. We doubled our helicopter production of the Bell Huey, the UH-1, from 75 a month to 150, and tripled the twin rotor Boeing-Vertol Chinook helicopters from 5 a month to 15. We had to maintain that production buildup at the same time that we were supporting a greatly increased number of helicopters in the field. You can't deny the necessary spare parts support to the people in the field, because the prosecution of the war suffers. By the same token, you can't sustain the effort you're involved in unless you get that buildup from 75 to 150. This is one example. The same thing would apply to fighter planes, etc. I remember bringing in Ducayet, the head of Bell, Bill Allen, the head of Boeing, and General Frank Besson, the head of Army Logistics, to my office in OSD. I told Ducayet and Allen that if they ever saw anything the Army was doing that they thought was hampering their efforts on helicopter production, I wanted them to let me know. I told Besson that if there was anything that was going wrong

in the companies, to let me know. We were going to get together, knock heads, solve the problems, and get both things done, namely, the support of the deployed forces and the production buildup. This was an intense, difficult period, but it was an example, I felt, of the tremendous response you could get from the military system and the U.S. economy when you put them to work. One of the things that made it most difficult was that we did not have at that time the wartime controls that one normally has in this kind of effort. We simply didn't have the ability to commandeer resources. It was brought home to me because it so happened that in that same period the U.S. and foreign airlines were shifting from propeller-driven airplanes to jet airplanes and Boeing and Douglas were very much involved, making worldwide sales as well as U.S. sales. We ran smack into the problem of our wanting to get all this aluminum forging and capacity for fighter plane and helicopter production, but the companies that were selling abroad as well as to the U.S. also had to fill their commercial orders. And Lyndon Johnson, who was very much worried about gold flow, if you remember, recognized the importance of aviation exports to managing the gold flow problem. He talked to McNamara. Joe Fowler from the Treasury Department came over and talked to me. We had somehow to work our way through this. It was a never-ending series of problems that were associated with prosecuting a war effort in an economy that did not have the defense priorities and controls that we had in World War II. Since the procurement, production, supply, and distribution problems came into my office, that was the principal activity that occupied me in that 3 1/2 year period.

Matloff: In connection with your organizing your staff to handle these problems, you spoke of bringing in industrialists and ironing out some problems and talking with the people on your staff at the OSD level. Did you make much use of outside consultants in the process?

Ignatius: I don't remember that we made much use of outside consultants. I depended on my own staff and on the military staffs. I changed the composition of my office to reflect the changed workload with the war.

Matloff: How was it organized?

Ignatius: There was a Deputy, who had rather general responsibility, but, as it turned out, he worked pretty much in the international logistics field. There was someone who was responsible for supply and distribution, and someone responsible for procurement. There were some great professionals. Jim Bannerman, the procurement man, was kind of a legendary figure in his field. The man in charge of supply was a 20-25 year veteran. There was an excellent man in the construction field. Where I made changes, it had to do with the war. I mentioned bringing in a military officer, Gen. Stanwix-Hay. We had terrible problems over shipping and I brought in a marvelous civilian who had been a career man, particularly in the Navy, Bob Moot, and put him in charge of the whole shipping program. Bob is an enormously capable person, a great credit to the civil service, who later became Comptroller of the Defense Department. I was seeing industrialists all the time, who represented their companies on some of our programs, but I don't remember bringing in people from industry to augment the staff in my office. I looked to the uniformed people and the career civilians.

Matloff: What were your working relationships with Secretary of Defense McNamara and Deputy Secretaries Vance and Nitze, in this position?

Ignatius: There was a telephone where McNamara could get me by pushing a button and I could get him by pushing a button. I very seldom pushed the button to interrupt him, but he would very frequently push it to get me. The conversations were very quick. I had a regular half-hourly weekly meeting with him and Vance, and in the event McNamara couldn't be there, which seldom happened, I'd meet with Vance. The purpose of that meeting was to review progress on certain objectives that we had set and for him to give me any needed guidance. I always worked from an agenda, tightly written with two or three pages of starred items. I would give a copy to him and he would comment on it. Then there were any number of things he would ask me to come in and talk about in addition to our regular meetings. For example, at one point we had 110 ships waiting to unload in Saigon. President Johnson was terribly concerned about this. Among other things, they made a military target of great value. Every ship not unloading meant it had supplies that were needed in the field. These were old ships—World War II Liberty ships. The reason they were waiting to be unloaded was because the port facilities weren't adequate. We were trying overnight to create the logistical infrastructure there, in order to get on with the prosecution of this very major effort.

Matloff: How about your relationships with the Assistant Secretaries, like Comptrollers Hitch and Anthony?

Ignatius: I worked with Anthony and Hitch probably more closely than I did when I was in my Army post. Again, this often was on matters involving the prosecution of the war—the necessary funding or other matters. I saw them regularly and we dined together in the OSD Dining Room.

Matloff: How about people like Assistant Secretaries for Manpower Paul and Morris?

Ignatius: Morris was gone by then, and I guess Norm Paul was in manpower. I don't remember many contacts with him on manpower matters; I was pretty busy with logistical problems.

Matloff: Any other Assistant Secretaries?

Ignatius: Yes, the R&D people—I had dealings with them when I was at the Army level, but also in OSD. These would be Harold Brown and Gene Fubini. Harold later went to the Air Force job and Johnny Foster came in. I had a lot of dealings with them because we were in a continuum, if you will, as far as procurement, or acquisition, as it is now called, was concerned—things by and large starting in the R&D side and ending up in the procurement side. So they would get into my business and I would get into theirs, and we had contact of a continuing sort.

Matloff: How about with DARPA?

Ignatius: I don't remember too many dealings with DARPA. The implications of some of DARPA's work for weapons acquisition, etc., came to my attention, but I don't remember having many dealings with DARPA people. DARPA had an office in Vietnam, as I remember, where it had people looking at applications of new weapons and new concepts of warfare.

Matloff: How about with the military services? Did you, in turn, do what Morris had done with you when you were in the Army equivalent?

Ignatius: Yes, I did, with the Assistant Secretaries. I continued that, because it was a very useful thing to do. But I probably had more contact with the military side, the uniformed side of the services, than Tom did, because, again, of the war. I was seeing vice chiefs of staff and chiefs of staffs, logistical chiefs, more than Tom did, because of the war. I also worked a lot with the J-4, the Assistant for Logistics on the J-Staff, Gen. Richard Myer, at the time. We had a lot of dealings because of the Vietnam War. To that extent, also, I think that was probably different from Tom's period.

Matloff: How about the Service Secretaries?

Ignatius: Yes, a lot of these problems had to get resolved at the Service Secretary level, so that in addition to seeing the Navy logistical people, I had to see Paul Nitze, for example. In the case of the Air Force, I remember several things. I mentioned something about a problem with forgings. We got started with the head of logistics in the Air Force, Gen. Tom Gerrity, and then moved up to the Vice Chief level, Bozo McKee. We worked with him, and eventually, I guess, with Secretary Zuckert or Harold Brown. We all knew one another. I had known Gene Zuckert for many years. He was an Assistant Dean when I was a student at the Harvard Business School. Bob Anthony had been a young professor at the Harvard Business School when I was a student there. I knew Bob, who helped me, when I was Navy Secretary, to recruit Chuck Bowsher as my financial management secretary. We knew one another, for various reasons, but we had

also worked together for quite a long period in different jobs, and respected one another. So a lot of this was done through conversation among people who worked together with McNamara, the king pin.

Matloff: How about dealings with the JCS, in this capacity—the Chairman, or the members?

Ignatius: Again, with regard to the Vietnam War, there were a lot of things. I will give you one or two examples. I talked about that ammunition problem that developed for various reasons. I learned, many years later, that there had been a meeting in the inner sanctum of the JCS on this, and that Gen. Wheeler, who was Chairman, told the Chiefs about this ammunition problem. As it was reported to me much later, he said, "Don't worry about it, because Paul is on top of it." I must say that gave me the most marvelous feeling, to learn ten years later that Bus Wheeler had told the Chiefs that. That's the kind of thing that makes all the long hours of work somehow come into focus, and it gave me a great deal of satisfaction. There was a lot of work with the J-4 and the transportation people. I worked a lot with the Navy Sea Command and the Air Force's MATs—the Air Force Military Air Transport Service, because we were shipping so much [redacted] on priority. We had real problems with our sealift. That sealift was old and antiquated and the U.S. Merchant Marine was not in very good shape.

Matloff: How about with Congress?

Ignatius: I think I probably logged more hours of testimony than even Bob McNamara did.

Matloff: Over what issues?

Ignatius: First, there were all of the usual things, involving the budgets and the additional augmented budgets and supplementals. There were also special hearings that arose from problems associated with the war. in some cases real, and in some cases blown out of proportion. For example, there were hearings in the Senate before the Preparedness Committee that Senator Stennis chaired having to do with ammunition. I was there for extended hearings on that. There were hearings on clothing. We had a situation develop over the Marine Corps' "bag," as it was called, a sort of duffel bag, in which the individual Marine was supposed to have all his entitled pieces of uniform. There was one period when the winter green uniform was in short supply and some of the bags that were issued to the Marines going to the Far East were deficient in the case of that uniform. This somehow became a big thing. Gen. Wallace Green was then the Commandant, and there was quite an irreverent and intemperate cartoon in one of the papers showing a Marine with a barrel around him. They were known as the "bare-assed Marines" at the time. I said it didn't seem important not to have a winter uniform in the tropics, but they were entitled to it, and we didn't have it temporarily so it was a "shortage." These kinds of problems developed and we were fighting them all the time, in order to make sure that we had everything we needed.

Matloff: How about that old problem of base closings, was that not an issue in this period?

Ignatius: I think that it was probably deemphasized. We must have had something going on in that period also. I don't think we lost complete sight of of it, but as I best remember, it was not a major preoccupation.

Matloff: How knowledgeable did you find the congressional committees and their staffs in the field of installations and logistics?

Ignatius: I had great respect for the Congress and their staffs. I took the hearings very seriously, and put a lot of time into preparation, because the legislative and particularly the oversight function of some of these activities were extremely important. I found that the members would generally overcome their parochial constituent interests if you could tell them why it was that you needed to do something. In other words, they were good Americans, like everybody else. They had some particular problems back home that you had to take account of, but if you told them why you were doing something and helped them take some of the flak for it, they were more than willing to go along and be helpful. I never had any problems in that regard. We had to meet—it took time—people sometimes got angry, but we were always able to work it out. The staffs generally were quite good. Some of them, like Frank Sanders, eventually came over to the Department of Defense. Frank became an Assistant Secretary of the Navy. There were others—often very capable people. The congressmen were a cross-section, to some extent, of the population. They were people for whom I had the most enormous respect. The House Defense Appropriations Committee had some top flight people—George Mahon, Jerry Ford, Mel Laird. But there were several other people, whom you would put in another category, and who sat on that same committee and later got themselves into trouble of various kinds.

Matloff: One of our great regrets in this interview program is that George Mahon died before we could get to talk to him, but we do have President Ford interested.

Ignatius: Ford was good. When we would testify over a period of time, and a number of us had been there for a long time, he would say, "Wait a minute, last year when you were here you said such and such. Tell me what happened." There would be some follow-up. I remember once somebody started a line of questioning about a procurement that occurred when a sole source award had been made, not a big one, for a piece of equipment. I said, "I made that decision, and I am responsible for it." I then began to explain what it was. It was the heart of a piece of cryptological equipment for the NSA. I said, "Preserving the secrecy of that was, in my judgment, far more important than whatever benefits we might get from competitive procurement." George Mahon immediately jumped in and asked that the whole thing be expunged from the record, and commended me for it. The point I want to make is that I believe that if an official from the Department, who is knowledgeable about what he or she is doing, assumes responsibility, and makes some kind of reasonable man's explanation of what it was, the worst that can happen is that the people will say, "If I had been there, I'm not sure I would have come out that way, but at least I understand what you were doing and why you did it." That always seemed to me the essence of dealing with Congress. If you were able to look a man in the eye and say, "This is what I did and this is why I did it," you were all right. If for any reason you couldn't do that, then you'd better look at what it was you were involved in and find

some other way to do it. That to me was always the final, acid test—can I explain this reasonably to a reasonable man? If so, then I am doing the right thing. I tried to be guided by that in relations with Congress. There was a lot of testimony in regular hearings, special hearings, and then in meetings that would arise from any number of causes.

Matloff: Did you have complete leeway from the Secretary of Defense in testifying on the Hill, or did you have to hew to a position?

Ignatius: I had the confidence of the Secretary. He thought that I knew what I was doing and he left me alone. The term "hewing" has an implication that there was a party line that I had to follow. I wasn't conscious that there was anybody overseeing or censoring what I was doing.

Trask: Did you ever have to submit the text of your testimony to anybody prior to your delivering it?

Ignatius: I think there was a requirement for this, and I must have at one time or another been involved in it. I believe where this became important and what gave rise to it was that early on in the McNamara period there were officers who were spending a lot of time making speeches all around the country. Some of what they were speaking about I think conflicted with some of the views that President Kennedy or others may have held. I remember McNamara approaching it pragmatically, saying, "If General X is really going to do the job that he is supposed to do as Chief of this particular area, he sure can't be spending that much time making speeches." Also, some of the speeches turned out to be inconsistent with some of the things that the President wanted to do. So I believe that

there was an OSD regulation that required submission of public addresses to the Office of Public Affairs, but in my area I don't believe that it was a problem.

Matloff: If there had been differences of views between yourself and the Secretary of Defense in the area of your specialty, and you had to testify, that might have given some heartburn.

Ignatius: No question about it. Bob knew, for example, when I was going up to testify on the ammunition hearings, or on something else, that I was working on the problem day-to-day and knowledgeable, and he knew that I was trying to do the best job I could and that I would try to convey that. There was never any friction between McNamara and me. I had the highest regard for him, and worked as a member of his team, and I think he reposed a certain amount of trust and confidence in me. I'm sure that there were times in some of those Friday meetings when I may have said to Bob or Vance, "I'm going to be called to testify on such and such a thing. Some of this is pretty tough, and here's what I'm going to say." That would give us a chance for informal discussion or permit me to seek guidance sometimes in order to make sure that I was portraying the problem properly.

Matloff: Do you recall any strong differences of views with McNamara on any subject in a field related to your activities?

Ignatius: I told him on some occasions that I thought that he ought to spend more time with the services, and particularly on the logistical side with some of the uniformed people. I said, "You are so damn good when you meet one-on-one or with groups of these people, that it would do

you good in the sense that your programs would be better understood. You ought to do more of that." He would look at the clock—he was always conscious of time—and say, "There isn't time." I disagreed with him; I thought that might have been a better use of some of his time. On matters affecting work, he was demanding, with the resultant feeling that sometimes he was asking for more than you could do. But there again, if you're going to do good work, you ought to be held to high standards, and I think that was one of the good qualities he had. He held you to pretty tough standards. I don't remember major differences. McNamara began having serious concerns about the Vietnam War, as a number of us did, but for the most part he didn't talk to me about it. I remember vividly one conversation after the Tet Offensive where we talked about some of those concerns, but he talked to me about my areas of responsibility, and I guess he talked to John McNaughton about his areas of responsibility.

Matloff: Did you have any dealings with the press about installations and logistics?

Ignatius: There were individual interviews and some press briefings. I never sought out the press particularly. They would come to me from time to time, but I wasn't as active in that regard, perhaps, as some people were. I don't know whether I'm being critical of myself or not, but it's a fact. I met when I needed to and when they wanted to, but I didn't do too much.

Matloff: We're approaching that time. We'd like to come back and finish the portion on the OSD level and then go on to your Navy experience.

Ignatius: All right. I could do it the same time on Monday morning, April 27.

PAUL R. IGNATIUS
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20016

October 19, 1987

Dr. Alfred Goldberg
OSD Historian

Dear Dr. Goldberg:

I am enclosing the transcripts of my oral interviews which I have reviewed and corrected here and there as necessary.

With regard to your question about future access, I would like the transcripts ~~to be subject to the Category 3 limitation, that is, open only to DOD historians.~~

I look forward to receiving my copies of the transcripts when they are ready.

Best wishes.

Sincerely,

Paul R. Ignatius